Thein Sein must come clean on the ambitions ofhis military to break away from Myanmar's past.
Last Modified: 19 Aug 2013 14:21
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Questions have been raised over the resources pumped into Myanmar's military,
which receives more than a fifth of the total state budget each year
[Reuters]
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Three
years ago a defector from the Myanmar military fled the country with
extensive
documentation of a nascent secret nuclear programme. The chain
of custody and validation
of the material he possessed rivals the
equivalent information currently attributed to Iran,
whose own
ambitions have become the target of threats of war from the US and
Israel.
But
after initial alarm, the world has largely fallen silent on Myanmar's
programme.
In November last year the government made a welcome promise
that
it would signthe
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional
Protocol,
thereby allowing the IAEA to carry out nuclear inspections inside the
country to resolve outstanding allegations of a past nuclear programme.
To date, however, no such protocol has been signed, and Myanmar remains
hidden behind an old agreement that allows them to state that they have
no
significant nuclear materials, and avoid inspections or even
answering
questions.
The
upshot is that the world remains as in the dark about the work being
undertaken in
highly secretive factories operated by the military as it
did when photos and testimonies first
emerged. In addition to the
evidence of the early stages of a nuclear programme aired in
a documentary
co-produced by the Democratic Voice of Burma and Al Jazeera in June
2010,
it is widely known that some 5,000 young Myanmar engineers have
been trained in Moscow
in missile, engineering and nuclear technologies. So when senior Myanmar officials deny
the existence of any nuclear programme and stonewall the IAEA, suspicions are aroused.
Myanmar's
immediate neighbours have also fallen silent on the issue. The
Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc has not followed
through in investigating the
allegations, given the rush to take
advantage of opening markets and lucrative oil and gas
contracts.
Perhaps this selectivity has also guided Washington's reluctance to
press Myanmar as hard as it has other global nuclear threats.
The
US has pointed out that missile cooperation between Myanmar and North
Korea is real
and must be stopped. Leaked photos and documents from a
2008 visit to North Korea by
Shwe Mann, then the Myanmar junta's
third-in-command, and now a powerful speaker of
the Lower House with
presidential ambitions, showed the delegation touring missile factories
and meeting with Jon Byong Ho, who was a key figure in North Korea's own proliferation
programme.
While
nuclear cooperation between the two countries is a much lower concern -
little
evidence exists to suggest that Pyongyang has supplied
information or material to support
such a programme in Myanmar - the
administration of President Thein Sein could clear up
whatever lingering
doubt is there with openness and candour.
An
opportunity presents itself in September. The IAEA will be holding its
annual General
Conference (GC) where all state parties to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty will be present. The GC is covered by the world
press and is an ideal venue for Myanmar to boldly follow through on the
signing promise. It would
receive considerable world attention and be
another step on the road to normalcy.
One
word of caution is required. When a country signs a treaty or
agreement, it does not
take effect until the legislature
of that country ratifies it. In the Southeast Asia region we
have
examples, such as the Philippines, which signed an Additional Protocol
but did not
bring it into force for 12 years. Malaysia and Thailand
signed in 2006 but have yet to ratify it,
presumably because it is a low
priority for the governments.
Even
when the treaty is ratified, the internal efforts needed to bring it
into
force require many administrative and legal steps, including
establishing
regulatory and investigative bodies and appropriate
legislation so that they
can respond to IAEA requests for information in
an orderly and complete
way
The
best way to move forward is for Myanmar to sign in September and then
immediately
inform the IAEA that the Additional Protocol has been
signed. Myanmar should then
immediately voluntarily respond to the IAEA as if the Protocol were in force.
This would
allow pressing questions to be posed and inspections to take
place almost immediately, and
begin to close the books on Myanmar's
past nuclear ambitions.
Failure
to do so should rouse suspicion, and renew scrutiny of what projects
Naypyidaw is
pursuing in its secretive facilities.
Already we know of possible uranium mining and
processing in the
country's north, but its leaders refuse to acknowledge any such work.
If
there is no prohibited activity, Myanmar should allow those inspections
immediately.
Eight months has elapsed since the
promise to sign was made. In that time, questions have
been asked of the
need for the colossal resources pumped into Myanmar's military, which
still receives more than a fifth of the total state budget each year,
dwarfing both healthcare
and education combined. Millions of dollars
from this will have gone into a series of major
assaults on Kachin
rebels in the country's north, who were last year targeted with air
strikes.
Any suggestion by the government that it is scaling back the
might of its monolithic army,
comprised of some 400,000 troops, can be
roundly dismissed.
These
are all concerns that conflict with President Thein Sein's claims of a
break with
Myanmar's past. Washington's demands for transparency and
military reform in its new ally
should take precedent in its policy
toward the country, over that of access to markets.
It is also on Thein
Sein to come clean on the ambitions of his military. One step toward
achieving this could be taken with the signing of the Protocol in
September.
Robert
Kelley is a retired Los Alamos National Laboratory analyst specialising
in
nuclear weapons programmes worldwide. He was a Director at the IAEA
from
1992 to 1993 and from 2001 to 2005, responsible for
analysis of Iraq's nuclear
programmes.
Francis Wade is a Thailand-based freelance journalist and analyst covering
Myanmar and Southeast Asia.
1082
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily
reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
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Monday, 19 August 2013
Still in the dark on Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions
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